Prof. Dr. Georg Nöldeke
Georg Nöldeke is professor of economics at the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Basel. His research field is microeconomic theory with a focus on game theory and contract theory. He has published on topics like the efficiency of matching markets, the evolution of cooperation, and the incentive properties of option contracts in journals like Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and the Journal of Theoretical Biology. Currently, he teaches courses on intermediate microeconomics, decision under uncertainty, insurance economics, and contract theory at the University of Basel.
Georg Nöldeke studied at the University of Bonn, the University of California, Berkeley, and the London School of Economics. Before joining the University of Basel in 2006, he has held positions as an assistant professor at Princeton University (1992-94), as associate (1994-97) and full (1999-2006) professor at the University of Bonn, and as a full professor at the University of Basel (1997-99). Georg Nöldeke currently serves as a council member of the Game Theory Society. At the University of Basel he has co-founded the Bernoulli Network for the Behavioral Sciences.
Samuel Häfner and Georg Nöldeke: Sorting in iterated incumbency contests, September 2017
Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña: Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game, Journal of Mathematical Economics 88, 42-51 (2020).
Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke, and Thomas Tröger: The balance condition in search-and-matching models, Econometrica 88, 595-618 (2020).
Jorge Peña, Georg Nöldeke, and Oscar Puebla: The evolution of egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites, The American Naturalist 195, 524-533 (2020).
Jorge Peña and Georg Nöldeke: Group size effects in social evolution, Journal of Theoretical Biology 457, 211-220 (2018).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: The implementation duality, Econometrica 86:4, 1283-1324 (2018).
Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina, and Georg Nöldeke: Optimal search from multiple distributions with infinite horizon, Economics Letters 164, 15-18 (2018).
Samuel Häfner and Georg Nöldeke:Payoff shares in two-player contests, Games 7:3, 25 (2016).
Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information, Games and Economic Behavior 99, 71-81 (2016).
Jorge Peña and Georg Nöldeke: Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action, Journal of Theoretical Biology 389, 72-82 (2016).
Jorge Peña, Georg Nöldeke, and Laurent Lehmann: Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations, Journal of Theoretical Biology 382, 122-136 (2015).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Investment and competitive matching, Econometrica 83:3, 835-896 (2015).
Stephan Lauermann and Georg Nöldeke: Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions, Economics Letters 131, 1-4 (2015).
Jorge Peña, Laurent Lehmann, and Georg Nöldeke: Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games, Journal of Theoretical Biology 346, 23-33 (2014).
George Mailath andGeorg Nöldeke: Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?, Journal of Economic Theory 140:1, 97-125 (2008).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Optimal bunching without optimal control, Journal of Economic Theory 134:1, 405-420 (2007).
Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger: A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model, Annals of Finance 2:1, 73-85 (2006).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Information-based relative consumption effects: correction, Econometrica 73:4, 1383-1387 (2005).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability, Journal of Theoretical Biology 221, 53-59 (2003).
Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger: Existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model with multiple informed traders, Economics Letters 72:2, 159-164 (2001).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: How costly is the honest signaling of need?, Journal of Theoretical Biology 197, 527-539 (1999).
Georg Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt: Sequential investments and options to own, Rand Journal of Economics 29, 633-653 (1998).
Georg Nöldeke: On testing for financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1107-1113 (1997).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets, Journal of Economic Theory 73, 118-156 (1997).
Georg Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt: Option contracts and renegotiation: a solution to the hold-up problem, Rand Journal of Economics 26, 163-179 (1995).
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 425-454 (1993).
Georg Nöldeke and Eric van Damme: Signalling in a dynamic labour market, Review of Economic Studies 57, 1-23 (1990).