International Climate Policy

Date

Time

Topic

07.09.2012

09:30-13:00

International Climate Policy: Theory

14:00-17:30

International Climate Policy: Application

 

Prof. Dr. Ralph Winkler

International Climate Policy: Theory

Analyzing the Kyoto protocol, we discuss why effective international climate policy is so difficult to achieve. Studying the formation of international climate agreements in non-cooperative game settings, we discuss new architectures for successful international climate policy.

International Climate Policy: Application

Literature    

For the paper discussion in the afternoon the following articles will be used:

  • Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm and Thomas F. Rutherford (2009): The case of international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy. Journal of Environmental Economics & Management 58: 266–280. Link

  • Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006): Coalition formation in a global warming game: How the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making. Natural Resource Modeling 19: 323–358. Link

  • Hans Gersbach and Ralph Winkler (2011): International emission permit markets with refunding. European Economic Review 55: 759–773. Link

Letzte Änderung: 04.09.2012