Our research group investigates various research questions in the area of industrial organization using mainly theoretical models and laboratory experiments. Current projects include:

• Multigame Contact and Cooperation
  Many strategic situations involve players repeatedly interacting across multiple games. Even if each game is payoff-independent, repeated games can become strategically connected if players’ actions in one game depend on the outcome of another game. These links can lead to meaningful differences in strategies and outcomes, and we study their effect on cooperation in different game theoretical environments.
   
• Common Ownership and Quality Competition
  Common ownership which affects firms’ incentives in strategic interactions exists in many markets with imperfect competition. While its anticompetitive effect in markets with quantity or price competition is thoroughly studied we investigate the effect of common ownership on quality competition in oligopoly markets.
   
• Information in Innovation Tournaments
  Innovation tournaments, a vital source of R&D in recent years, differ markedly in their information structure. We study how information about rival performance affect investment incentives in innovation tournaments and how these effects interact with other design variables (e.g., the prize).
   
• Mergers Eliminating Mavericks
  We study how mergers eliminating mavericks, i.e., firms that disrupt collusive attempts, affect price competition in post-merger markets. We focus on the channel of collusive beliefs and strategic uncertainty to understand whether merger offers in relatively unconcentrated markets may serve as collusive signals to sustainably raise prices.

PhD candidates / Assistants