Veröffentlichte Aufsätze

Lily Ling Yang und Tsz-Ning Wong: Dynamic Expert Incentives in Teams,Games and Economic Behavior 125, 27-47 (2021).

Hao Hong und Tsz-Ning Wong: Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme, Journal of Theoretical Politics 32(3), 460-493 (2020).

Stefan Terstiege und Cédric Wasser: Buyer-Optimal Extensionproof Information, Journal of Economic Theory 188, 105070 (2020).

Georg Nöldeke und Jorge Peña: Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game, Journal of Mathematical Economics 88, 42-51 (2020).

Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke und Thomas Tröger: The balance condition in search-and-matching models, Econometrica 88, 595-618 (2020).

Lorenz Hartmann: Savage's P3 Is Redundant, Econometrica, 88(1), 203-205 (2020).

Jorge Peña, Georg Nöldeke und Oscar Puebla: The evolution of egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites, The American Naturalist 195, 524-533 (2020).

Simon Loertscher und Cédric Wasser: Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships, Theoretical Economics 14, 1063-1114 (2019).

Jorge Peña und Georg Nöldeke: Group size effects in social evolution, Journal of Theoretical Biology 457, 211-220 (2018).

Georg Nöldeke und Larry Samuelson: The implementation duality, Econometrica 86:4, 1283-1324 (2018).

Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger, und Cédric Wasser: Optimal Favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests, European Economic Review 104, 22-37 (2018).

Samuel Häfner: Stable biased sampling, Games and Economic Behavior 107, 109-122 (2018).

Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina, und Georg Nöldeke: Optimal search from multiple distributions with infinite horizon, Economics Letters 164, 15-18 (2018).

Tsz-Ning Wong und Lily Ling Yang: When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion, Economics Letters 163, 186–189 (2018).

Samuel Häfner: A tug-of-war team contest, Games and Economic Behavior 104, 372-391 (2017)

Samuel Häfner und Georg Nöldeke: Payoff shares in two-player contests, Games 7:3, 25 (2016).

Georg Nöldeke und Jorge Peña: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information, Games and Economic Behavior 99, 71-81 (2016).

Jorge Peña und Georg Nöldeke: Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action, Journal of Theoretical Biology 389, 72-82 (2016).

Jorge Peña, Georg Nöldeke, und Laurent Lehmann: Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations, Journal of Theoretical Biology 382, 122-136 (2015).

Georg Nöldeke und Larry Samuelson: Investment and competitive matching, Econometrica 83:3, 835-896 (2015).

Stephan Lauermann und Georg Nöldeke: Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions, Economics Letters 131, 1-4 (2015).

Stephan Lauermann und Georg Nöldeke: Stable marriages and search frictions, Journal of Economic Theory 151, 163-195 (2014).

Jorge Peña, Laurent Lehmann, und Georg Nöldeke: Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games, Journal of Theoretical Biology 346, 23-33 (2014).

Christian Seel und Cédric Wasser: On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions, Economics Letters 124, 211-214 (2014).

Cédric Wasser: Bilateral k+1 price auctions with asymmetric shares and values, Games and Economic Behavior 82, 350-368 (2013).

Cédric Wasser: A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests, Mathematical Social Sciences 66, 180-182 (2013).

Cédric Wasser: Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests, Economic Theory 53, 239-269 (2013). 

George Mailath and  Georg  Nöldeke: Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?, Journal of Economic Theory 140:1, 97-125 (2008).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Optimal bunching without optimal control, Journal of Economic Theory 134:1, 405-420 (2007).

Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger: A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model, Annals of Finance 2:1, 73-85 (2006).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Information-based relative consumption effects: correction, Econometrica 73:4, 1383-1387 (2005).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability, Journal of Theoretical Biology 221, 53-59 (2003).

Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger: Existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model with multiple informed traders, Economics Letters 72:2, 159-164 (2001).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: How costly is the honest signaling of need?, Journal of Theoretical Biology 197, 527-539 (1999).

Georg Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt: Sequential investments and options to own, Rand Journal of Economics 29, 633-653 (1998).

Georg Nöldeke: On testing for financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1107-1113 (1997).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets, Journal of Economic Theory 73, 118-156 (1997).

Georg Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt: Option contracts and renegotiation: a solution to the hold-up problem, Rand Journal of Economics 26, 163-179 (1995).

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson: An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 425-454 (1993).

Georg Nöldeke and Eric van Damme: Signalling in a dynamic labour market, Review of Economic Studies 57, 1-23 (1990).